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LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
"The right of a person to sell his labor," says Mr. Justice
Harlan, "upon such terms as he deems proper, is in its essence,
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person
offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to quit the service
of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right
of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the ser-
vices of such employee ........ In all such particulars the
employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legis-
lation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally
justify in a free land." ' With this positive declaration of a
lawyer, the culmination of a line of decisions now nearly twenty-
five years old, a statement which a recent writer on the science of
jurisprudence has deemed so fundamental as to deserve quotation
and exposition at an unusual length, as compared with his treat-
ment of other points, 2 let us compare the equally positive state-
ment of a sociologist:
"Much of the discussion about 'equal rights' is utterly hollow.
All the ado made over the system of contract is surcharged with
fallacy." '
To everyone acquainted at first hand with actual industrial
conditions the latter statement goes without saying. Why, then do
courts persist in the fallacy? Why do so many of them force
upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of
practical conditions of inequality? Why do we find a great and
learned court in 19o8 taking the long step into the past of deal-
ing with the relation between employer and employee in railway
transportation, as if the parties were individuals-as if they were
farmers haggling over the sale of a horse ? 4  Why is the legal
conception of the relation of employer and employee so at
variance with the common knowledge of mankind? The late Presi-
' Adair v. United States, 2o8 U. S. I6r, 175.
2 Taylor, Science of Jurisprudence, pp. 538-542.
s Ward, Applied Sociology, 281. See Wright, Practical Sociology.
(5th Ed.) 226, Seager, Introduction to Economics, (3rd Ed.) Sects. 234 ff.
"For one who really understands the facts and forces involved, it is mere
juggling with words and empty legal phrases." Ely, Economic Theory ani
Labor Legislation, 18.
4 See Mr. Olney's paper, 42 American Law Review, 164.
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dent has told us that it is because individual judges project their
personal, social and economic views into the law. A great Ger-
man publicist holds that it is because the party bent of judges has
dictated decisions. 5 But when a doctrine is announced with equal
vigor and held with equal tenacity by courts of Pennsylvania and
of Arkansas, of New York and of California, of Illinois and of
West Virginia, of Massachusetts and of Missouri, we may not
dispose of it so readily. Surely the sources of such a doctrine
must lie deeper. Let us inquire then, what further and more
potent causes may be discovered, how these causes have operated
to bring about the present state of the law as to freedom of con-
tract, what the present doctrine of the courts is upon that subject,
and how far we may expect amelioration thereof in the near
future.
It is significant that the subject, so far as the form it now takes
is concerned, is a new one. The phrase "liberty of contract" is not
to be found in Lieber's Civil Liberty and Self-Government, pub-
lished in 1853. It is not to be found in Professor Burgess's
Political Science and Constitutional Law, published in i89o. The
first decision turning upon it was rendered in 1886.6 The first
extended discussion of the right of free contract as a fundamental
natural right is in Spencer's Justice,' written in i89i. The
eighteenth century writers on natural law say nothing about it.
Fichte's discussion of the natural basis of civil law is silent with
respect to it." Even Bentham says that the function of govern-
ment is to create and confer upon individuals "rights of personal
security, rights of protection for honor, rights of property, rights
of receiving aid in case of need." 9 Ahrens (1837) argues, not
natural liberty of contract, but natural restraints on that liberty.'
Grotius, indeed, at the very outset of the school of natural law,
mentions liberty of contract as a natural right." But his idea
was not at all the one with which we are concerned here. He was
insisting, not on the unrestricted right to make promises, but on
the natural force of promises when made.12  For the chief
5 Jellinek, System der subjectiven 6ffentlichen Rechte, ioi, n. r.
6 Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431.
Spencer, Justice, Chap. XV.
s Theory of Legislation (Hildreth's translation), 95.
6 Theory of Legislation (Hildreth's translation), 95.
10 Cours de droit Naturel, Bk. II, Sect. 83.
"1 Bk. III, Chap. ri, Sect. 4.
12 "And again, no reason can be found why laws, which are, as it
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problem of the natural law jurists was to square the practical
with the ideal, to test all things by reason and to throw off empty
forms. They warred against rules derived from antiquity that
enforced contracts rather than promises. They argued that en-
forceability of promises should depend on a more reasonable
basis than form or than the traditional categories of Roman law.
Hence to Grotius, to Puffendorf,3 to Burlamaqui,'4 the problem
was the source of the binding power of a promise.' 5 To the
eighteenth century jurist, the all important thing was that
promises should be kept. Montesquieu's description of the
Troglodytes, who perished utterly because they wilfully violated
contracts, l8 expresses their feeling. That promises have in fact
had to depend during the greater part of legal history much
more upon individual honesty than upon positive law, seemed to
them at variance with the law of nature. 7 We see an echo of
this discussion in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in
Sturges v. Crowninshield.8
The idea that unlimited freedom of making promises was a
natural right came after enforcement of promises when made,
had become a matter of course. It began as a doctrine of politi-
cal economy, as a phase of Adam Smith's doctrine which we
commonly call laisser faire.19 It was propounded as a utilitarian
principle of politics and legislation by Mill.20  Spencer deduced
it from his formula of justice. In this way it became a chief
article in the creed of those who sought to minimize the functions
of the state, that the most important of its functions was to
were, a common pact of the people, and are so called by Aristotle and
Demosthenes, should be able to give obligatory force to pacts, which the
will of a person, directed especially and by every means to obligating
himself, may not do so, especially where the civil law offers no impediment
[i. e., to performance]." Ibid., Sect. 3.
"s Law of Nature and Nations, Bk. III, Ch. 4.
"4 Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Bk. II, Pt. 4, Ch. io, Sect.
4. See also the end of Chap. 7, in Bk. I, Pt. i.
'5 Ahrens, Cours de droit Naturel (8th Ed.), Bk. II, 238.
18 Lettres Persanes, Lettre XIV, et seq.
7 Maine, Ancient Law, Pollock's Ed., 325.
1 4 Wheat. 122, 197.
19 Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV, Chap. IX, Thorold Rogers' Ed. IT,
272-3. Ricardo laid it down as a principle of political economy that legis-
lation should not interfere with contracts. Works (McCulloch's Ed.), 57.
See a discussion of the juristic bearings of these doctrines in Berolz-
heimer's System der Rechts und Wirthschaftsphilosophic, II. § 32.
2oLiberty, Chap. IV.
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enforce by law the obligations created by contract.
21 But we
must remember that the task of the English individualists was to
abolish a body of antiquated institutions that stood in the way of
human progress. Freedom of contract was the best instrument
at hand for the purpose. They adopted it as a means, and made
it an end.2 2 While this evolution of juristic and political thought
was in progress, the common law too had become thoroughly
individualistic; partly from innate tendency, partly through theo-
logical influence, partly through the contests between the courts
and the crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and
partly as a result of the course of thought in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. This bit of history may suggest the chief,
although not all, of the causes of the phenomenon we are con-
sidering.
In my opinion, the causes to which we must attribute the
course of American constitutional decisions upon liberty of con-
tract are seven: (i) The currency in juristic thought of an in-
dividualist conception of justice, which exaggerates the im-
portance of property and of contract, exaggerates private right
at the expense of public right, and is hostile to legislation, taking
a minimum of law-making to be the ideal; (2) what I have ven-
tured to call on another occasion a condition of mechanical juris-
prudence, a condition of juristic thought and judicial action in
which deduction from conceptions has produced a cloud of rules
that obscures the principles from which they were drawn, in
which conceptions are developed logically at the expense of prac-
tical results and in which the artificiality characteristic of legal
reasoning is exaggerated; (3) the survival of purely juristic
notions of the state and of economics and politics as against the
social conceptions of the present; (4) the training of judges and
lawyers in eighteenth century philosophy of law and the pre-
tended contempt for philosophy in law that keeps the legal pro-
fession in the bonds of the philosophy of the past because it is
to be found in law-sheep bindings: (5) the circumstance that
natural law is the theory of our bills of rights and the impossi-
bility of applying such a theory except when all men are agreed
in their moral and economic views and look to a single authority
to fix them; (6) the circumstance that our earlier labor legislation
21 Ritchie, Natural Rights, 227.
22 See Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in England, 148-i5o; Sidgwick,
Elements of Politics (2nd Ed.), 83.
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came before the public was prepared for it, so that the courts
largely voiced well-meant but unadvised protests of the old order
against the new, at a time when the public at large was by no
means committed to the new;2s and (7) by no means least, the
sharp line between law and fact in our legal system which re-
quires constitutionality, as a legal question, to be tried by artificial
criteria of general application and prevents effective judicial in-
vestigation or consideration of the situations of fact behind or
bearing upon the statutes.
Four stages may be observed in the development of the juristic
idea of justice. Understand me. I am not speaking of the ethical
conception nor of the political conception, closely as they are re-
lated to and much as they may have determined the juristic idea.
We say that the end of law is the administration of justice.
What do we mean here by the term "justice ?" What is it that
courts and jurists have sought to accomplish in the adjustment of
human relations in public tribunals? The primitive- idea was
simply to keep the peace. Justice, juristically, was a device to
keep the peace. Whatever served to avert private vengeance and
prevent private war was an instrument of justice. The Salic
Law awarded twice the compensation to the vigorous and half-
civilized Frank that it did to the effete and civilized Roman, be-
cause it required more to move the Frank to restrain his anger
and withhold his vengeance.2" But Greek philosophy and Roman
law soon got beyond this conception and gave us in its place an
idea of justice as a device to preserve the social status quo, to
keep each man in his appointed groove and tlms prevent friction
with his fellows. Plato sets this out very clearly.2 -- In his ideal
state, "every member of the community must be assigned to the
class for which he proves himself best fitted. Thus, a perfect
harmony and unitv will characterize both the state and every
person in it." 20 The Stoic doctrine of conformity to universal
reason came to much the same practical result.2 7  To Aristotle,
rights existed only between -those who were free and equal;28
23 Professor Seager has made a similar suggestion. Introduction to
Economics (3rd Ed.), 417.
.24 Salic Law, fit. XIV.
2- Republic, III, 424.
29Dunning. Political Theories, Ancient and Mediacmal, 28.
27 Ibid, 195.
28 Zeller. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (translated by Cos-
telloe and Muirhead), II, 175.
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jubtice demanded a unanimity in which there would be no viola-
tion of mutual rights, 2 9 and law and right took "account in the
first instance of relations of inequality, in which individuals are
treated in proportion to their worth, and only secondarily of re-
lations of equality." 30 Roman legal genius gave practical effect
to this idea of justice by making it the province of the state to
define and protect interests and powers of action which in the
aggregate made up the legal personality of the individual. 31 The
precepts of law, as laid down in the Institutes,--honeste vivere,
alienum non laedere, sunm cuique tribuere--come to this. As
Courcelle-Seneuil has put it, the Roman ideal was a stationary
society, corrected from time to time by a reversion to the ancient
type.3 12 Roman natural law was simply an appeal to reason
against formalism. The natural law of the middle ages and of
the seventeenth century-an appeal to reason against authority-
is a very different thing.
Appeal to reason against authority led to a new conception in
philosophy, in theology, in politics and ultimately in legal theory,
as a result of which justice came to be regarded as a device to
secure a maximum of individual self-assertion. The beginnings
of this are in philosophy. As Lord Acton put it: "Not the devil,
but St. Thomas Aquinas was the first Whig." 33 Teutonic indi-
vidualism, kept back by Roman authority in religion and law,
broke over. Puritan theology gave rise to ultra individualism in
church polity and religion. The appeal to reason against the
crown developed political doctrines of civil liberty and natural
rights of the individual. And as Coke, the great light of our
legal system, was in the forefront of the controversy with the
crown and read all legal history in the light of the exigencies
of that controversy, 3- the liberties of the individual Englishman
came to assume a central point in that system that would have
been taken by public good and the powers of the state if Bacon
2 Eth. Nicomach. VIII., I, 24.
3 Zeller, op. cit. II, 197.
31 This is well put in Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient
I1orld, 64.
32 Priparation a l'6tude du droit, 99, 396. See Guyot, Principles of
Social Economy (Leppington's translation), 2nd Ed. 299.
3 Figgis, From Gcrson to Grotius, 7.
3 Compare his interpretation of Tregor's Case (Y. B. 8 E. 3. 3o) and
the case in Fitzh. Abr. Cessavit, 42. in Bonham's Case. 9 Rep. ioSa. II8a,
with the cases themselves.
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rather than Coke had been the inspiration of eighteenth century
commentators and nineteenth century courts. Moreover, our
constitutional models and our bills of rights were drawn in the
period in which the natural law school of jurists was at its
zenith, and the growing period of American law coincided with
the high tide of individualistic ethics and economics. Hence his
school course in political economy and his office reading of
Blackstone taught the nineteenth century judge the same things
as fundamentals.3 5 He became persuaded that they were the
basis of the jural order, and, as often happens, the individualist
conception of justice reached its complete logical development
after the doctrine itself had lost its vitality. Social justice, the
last conception to develop, had already begun to affect not merely
legal thought but legislation and judicial decision, while the
courts were working out the last extreme deductions from the
older conception."8
M. Worms, taking no account of the first stage above sug-
gested, has summed up the other three in these words: "To sum
up, justice has tried to organize society to the profit of force,
later independently of force, and it dreams to-day of organizing
it against force." 3' But our ideal of justice has been to let every
force play freely and exert itself completely, limited only by the
necessity of avoiding friction. As a result, and as a result of
35 "Like all other contracts, wages should be left to the fair and
free competition of the market, and should never be controlled by the
interference of the legislature." Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy,
Chap. V. § 7. Chapter XI of Bk. V. of Mill's Political Economy, en-
titled "Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-Inter-
ference Principle." was studied by every liberally educated lawyer of the
last fifty years. Mill (Ibid., Sect. 12) disapproves of, but at the same time
suggests an argument in favor of legislation limiting the hours of labor.
In Laughlin's Edition (1884) the editor argues against such legislation
(p. 393). We are now prepared to read in the opinion of O'Brien, J., in
People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i, that "A law that restricts the freedom of
contract on the part of both the master and servant cannot in the end
operate to the benefit of either" (p. 6). Also: "It was once a political
maxim that the government governs best which governs the least. It is
possible that we have now outgrown it, but it was an idea that was always
present to the minds of the men who framed the Constitution, and it is
proper for the courts to bear it in mind when expounding that instru-
ment." (P. 14.)
36 See my paper, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, ig Green
Bag, 607.
37 Philosophie des Sciences Sociales, 1, .
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our legal history, we exaggerate the importance of property and
of contract, as an incident thereof. A leader of the bar, opposing
the income tax, argues that a fundamental object of our polity is
"preservation of the rights of private property." 38  Text writers
tell us of the divine origin of property.39 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin tells us that the right to take property by will is an
absolute and inherent right, not depending upon legislation.
0
The absolute certainty which is one of our legal ideals, an ideal
responsible for much that is irritatingly mechanical in our legal
system, is demanded chiefly to protect property." And our courts
regard the right to contract, not as a phase of liberty-a sort of
freedom of mental motion and locomotion-but as a phase of
property, to be protected as such.' 2 A further result is to exag-
gerate private right at the expense of public interest. Black-
stone's proposition that "the public good is in nothing more essen-
tially interested than in the protection of every individual's private
rights,' 3 has been quoted in more than one American decision;44
and one of these is a case often cited in support of extreme doc-
trines of liberty of contract. 45  It is but a corollary that liberty of
contract cannot be restricted merely in the interest of a contract-
ing party. His right to contract freely is to yield only to the
safety, health, or moral welfare of the public.
46  Still another
result is that bench and bar distrust and object to legislation. I
have discussed the history and the causes of this attitude toward
38Argument of Mr. Choate in the Income Tax cases, 157 U. S.
429, 534.
3 Smith, Personal Property, Sect. 33. Berolzheimer sums up the
characteristic features of common law legal speculation thus: "Un-
limited high valuation of individual freedom and respect for individual
property." System des Rechts und Wirthschaftsphilosophie, II. i6o.
40 Nunnemacher v. State, xo8 N. W. 627.
41 See my paper, Enforcement of Law, 2o Green Bag, 401, 408.
42 Occasionally it is said to be "both a liberty and a property right."
Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, i8i. Professor. Seager suggests another
reason for American exaggeration of the importance of property. Intro-
duction to Economics (3rd Ed.), 21. He points out that this exaggeration
has resulted in "an industrial civilization which has been marked thus
far by intense individualism in thought and practice."
48 1 Comm. 139.
4See for example Wynhamcr v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 387; Chase v,.
Beal, 31 Mich. 491.
45 Wynhamer v. People, supra.
46 People v. Marcus, 128 N. Y. 257, In re House Bill 203, 21 Col.
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legislation on another occasion.4r Suffice it to say here that the
doctrine as to liberty of contract is bound up in the decisions of
our courts with a narrow view of what constitutes special or class
legislation that greatly limits effective law-making. If we can
only have laws of wide generality of application, we can have only
a few laws; for the wider their application the more likelihood
there is of injustice in concrete cases. But from the individualist
standpoint a minimum of law is desirable. The common law
antipathy to legislation sympathizes with this, and in consequence
we find courts saying that it is not necessary to consider the rea-
sons that led up to the type of legislation they condemn 48 and that
the maxim that the government governs best which governs least
is proper for courts to bear in mind in expounding the Con-
stitution.
49
The second cause, a condition of mechanical jurisprudence, I
have discussed in its relation to the legal system generally in
another place.50 The effect of all system is apt to be petrifaction
of the subject systematized. Legal science is not exempt from
this tendency. Legal systems have their periods in which system
decays into technicality, in which a scientific jurisprudence be-
comes a mechanical jurisprudence. In a period of growth through
juristic speculation and judicial decision, there is little danger of
this. But whenever such a period has come to an end, when its
work has been done and its legal theories have come to maturity,
jurisprudence tends to decay. Conceptions are fixed. The
premises are no longer to be examined. Everything is reduced
to simple deduction from them. Principles cease to have im-
portance. The law becomes a body of rules. This is the condi-
tion Professor Henderson refers to when he speaks of the way of
social progress as barred by barricades of dead precedents."1
Manifestations of mechanical jurisprudence are conspicuous in
the decisions as to liberty of contract. A characteristic one is
the rigorous logical deduction from predetermined conceptions
in disregard of and often in the teeth of the actual facts, which
47 Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harw,ard Law Review 383.
48 "For some reason, not necessary to consider, there has in modern
times arisen a sentiment favorable to paternalism in matters of legisla-
tion." Lowe v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 135. Cf. State v. Krcutz-
berg, 114 Wis. 530, 537.
49 People v. Coler, i66 N. Y. 1, 14.
50 Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Columbia Law Review, 6o5.
51 I1 American Journal Sociology, 847.
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was noted at the outset. Two courts, in passing on statutes
abridging the power of free contract have noted the frequency of
such legislation in recent times but have said that it was not
necessary to consider the reasons for it.52  Another court has
asked what right the legislature has to "assume that one class has
the need of protection against another." *3 Another has said that
the remedy for the company store evil "is in the hands of the
employee," since he is not compelled to buy from the employer,
4
forgetting that there may be a compulsion in fact where there is
none in law. Another says, that "theoretically there is among our
citizens no inferior class," 55 and of course no facts can avail
against that theory. Another tells us that man and woman have
the same rights, and hence a woman must be allowed to contract
to work as many hours a day as a man may.5 6 We have already
noted how Mr. Justice Harlan insists on a legal theory of equality
of rights in the latest pronouncement of the Federal Supreme
Court. Legislation designed to give laborers some measure of
practical independence, which, if allowed to operate, 'would put
them in a position of reasonable equality with their masters, is
said by courts, because it infringes on a theoretical equality, to
be insulting to their manhood 57 and degrading,58 to put them
under guardianship,5 to create a class of statutory laborers, 60
and to stamp them as imbeciles.6' I know of nothing akin to this
52 See cases in note 48 supra.
S State v. Haun, 61 Kans. 146, 162.
•.4 State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. i88, i9o. Those
who have studied the actual gituation do not look at it in this way. "He
is not free to make such a contract as might please him because, like
every party to a contract, he must come to such conditions as can possibly
be agreed upon. He is less free than the parties to most contracts, and,
further, he cannot utilize his labor in, many directions; he must contract
for it within restricted lines." Wright, Practical Sociology (5th Ed.), 226.
55 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, x86, holding against a statute prohibit-
ing company stores and requiring miners to be paid weekly.
56 Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 99, III.
57 Godcharles v. Wigenian, 113 Pa. St. 43r, 437 (wages in iron mills
"s State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. i79, 186 (store orders).
to be paid in money).
" Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 74 (coal to be weighed for
fixing wages); State v. Haun, 6i Kans. 146, 162 (wages to be paid in
money).
6oPcople v. Beck, io Misc. 77 (dissenting opinion of White, J.). The
statute fixed hours of labor on municipal contracts.
61 State v. Goodwill, supra; Frorcr v. People, 14T Ill. 17 r , 187 (com-
pany stores).
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artificial reasoning in jurisprudence unless it be the explanation
given by Pomponius for the transfer of legislative power from the
Roman people during the Empire: "The plebs found, in course
of time, that it was difficult for them to meet together, and the
general body of the citizens no doubt found it more difficult
still." 62 No doubt they did. ' Caesar or the praetorian prefect
would have seen to that.
Survival of a purely juristic notion of the state and of
economics and politics, in contrast with the social conception of
the present, the third cause suggested, can be looked at but
briefly. Formerly the juristic attitude obtained in religion, in
morals, and in politics as well as in law. This fundamentally
juristic conception of the world, due possibly to Roman law
being the first subject of study in the universities, which gave a
form of legality even to theology, has passed away elsewhere.
But it lingers in the courts. Jurisprudence is the last in the
march of the sciences away from the method of deduction from
predetermined conceptions. The sociological movement in juris-
prudence, the movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law,
the movement for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to
the human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed
first principles, the movement for putting the human factor in the
central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instru-
ment, has scarcely shown itself as yet in America. Perhaps the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New
York,"' is the best exposition of it we have.
Another factor of no mean importance in. producing the line
of decisions we are considering is the training of lawyers and
judges in eighteenth century theories of natural law. In a book
just published by a well-known writer on legal subjects who has
also been a teacher of law, the whole basis of discussion is natural
law. The learned author does not indicate a suspicion that any
62Dig. I, 2, 2, Sect. 9. Professor Seager says of these objections:
"The opposition to such regulations .. .... .. is based on the fear that
they may serve to undermine the spirit of independence of the protected
persons. Experience seems to indicate that they have in fact a directly
contrary effect." Introduction to Economics (3rd Ed.), 421. See also
p. 423: "Those who advance it fail to consider that deadening and
monotonous toil too long continued is much more inimical to the spirit
of independence than any amount of legislation."
63 198 U. S. 45, 75. But see also Holmes, The Path of the Law, io
Harvard Law Review, 457, 467, 472.
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doubt has been cast upon or may attach to his philosophical
premises.6 ' In another book published last year by a well-known
practitioner, it is recommended gravely that one subject of re-
quired study in preparation for the bar be "natural and civil law,
and the principles, foundation, and spirit of law," and the student
is expected to learn these from Grotius, Paley's Moral and Politi-
cal Philosophy, Burlamaqui's Natural Law, Puffendorf, and Mac-
Intosh's Discourses on the Study of the Law of Nature and
Nations."2 Until a comparatively recent date, all legal education,
whether in school or in office, began with the study of Blackstone.
Probably all serious office study begins with Blackstone or some
American imitator to-day. Many schools make Blackstone the first
subject of instruction to-day, and in others Blackstone is a sub-
ject of examination for admission or of prescribed reading after
admission, or there are courses on elementary law in which texts
reproducing the theories of the introduction to and the first book
of the Commentaries are the basis of instruction. A student who
is college-trained may have had a course or courses that brought
him in contact with modern thought. It is quite as likely he has
not, or if he has, the natural law theories which are a matter of
course in all our law books are not unlikely to persuade him that
what he learned in college is immaterial in the domain of law.6"
Constitutional law is full of natural law notions. For one thing,
there is the doctrine that apart from constitutional restrictions
there are individual rights resting on a natural basis, -to which
courts must give effect "beyond the control of the state." 67 In
the judicial discussions of liberty of contract this idea has been
very prominent. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in passing
on legislation directed against fines in cotton mills, tells us that
a statute which violates "fundamental" rights "is unconstitu-
64 Schouler, Ideals of the Republic (18o8).
65 Dos Passos, The American Lawyer, io8 (i9o7).
6 Cf. the review of Schouler's Ideals of the Republic in 22 Harvard
Law Review, 317.
67 Harlan, J., in Railway Co. v. Chicago, 2o6 U. S. 226, 237 (saying
that compensation for property taken for a public use is a "settled prin-
ciple of universal law reaching back of all constitutional provisions");
Field, J., in Butchers' Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., iii U. S.
746, 762 ("When such [police] regulations do not conflict with any con-
stitutional inhibition or natural right, their validity cannot be successfully
controverted."); Miller J., in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655,
662; Marshall, C. J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87; Iredell, J., in
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.
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tional and void, even though the enactment of it is not expressly
forbidden." 68 Another court reminds us that natural persons do
not derive their right to contract from the law.6 9 Another court,
in passing adversely upon legislation against company stores, says
any classification is arbitrary and unconstitutional unless it pro-
ceeds on "the natural capacity of persons to contract." "0 Another,
in passing on a similar statute, denies that contractual capacity
can be restricted, except for physical or mental disabilities.
7 '
Another holds that the legislature cannot take notice of the de
facto subjection of one class of persons to another in making con-
tracts of employment in certain industries, but must be governed
by the theoretical, jural equality.Ta These natural law ideas are
carried to an extreme by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Ritchie
v. People," in which case it is announced that women have a
natural equality with men and that no distinction may be drawn
between them with respect to power of engaging to labor.
Closely related to the ideas just considered, and, .indeed, a
product of the same training, is a deep-seated conviction of the
American lawyer that the doctrines of the common law are part
of the universal jural order. Just as in nine cases out of ten,
natural law meant for the seventeenth century and eighteenth
century jurist the Roman law which he knew and had studied,
for the common law lawyer it means the common law.74 For one
thing, this feeling leads to a narrow attitude toward legislation;
a tendency to hold down all statutory innovations upon the com-
mon law as far as possible.7 5 In like spirit, on this subject of
6s Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 17 (1871).
69 Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 427.
70 State v. Loomis, I'S Mo. 307, 315.
7 State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33 V. Va. 188.
7 State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 140, i62.
7s 155 Ill. 99-
74The classical instance of this is Cutting's Case, Snow, Cases on
International Law, 172. See also Marcy's confusion of the rules as to
citizenship in the several states of the United States with the rules of
International Law as to national character. Cockburn, Nationality, 118
et seq.
7' See for some examples of this, my paper, Common Law and Legis-
lation, 21 Harvard Law Review, 383. Another example is to be seen in
the judicial restrictions on the applications of Lord Campbell's Act. Deni
v. Pennsylvania Co., 181 Pa. St. 527; Brannigan v. Union Mit. Co., 93
Fed. 164; McMillan v. Spider Lake, etc., Co.. I1S Wis. 332; Roberts v.
Great Northern R. Co., i61 Fed. Rep. 239. The spirit of the courts in
these, cases is well illustrated by the following remark of the Supreme
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liberty of contract, most of the courts which have overthrown
legislation as being in derogation of liberty, have insisted that
only common law incapacities can be given legal recognition;",
that new incapacities in fact, growing out of new conditions in
business and industry, cannot be taken advantage of in legisla-
tion; that the ordinary farm-hand and the laborer in the beet
fields, for example, must be treated alike. But, even more im-
portant for our purpose, this feeling operates in constitutional
law to lead judges to try statutes by the measure of common law
doctrines rather then by the Constitution.7
Not only, however, is natural law the fundamental assumption
of our elementary books and of professional philosophy, but we
must not forget that it is the theory of our bills of rights. Not
unnaturally, therefore, courtshave clung to it as being the ortho-
dox theory of our constitutions. But the fact that the framers
held that theory by no means demonstrates that they intended to
impose the theory upon us for all time. It is contrary to their
principles to assume that they intended to dictate philosophical or
juristic beliefs and opinions to those who were to come after
them. What they did intend was the practical securing of each
individual against arbitrary and capricious governmental acts.
They intended to protect the people against their rulers, not
against themselves. They laid down principles, not rules, and
Court of Pennsylvania: "We must remember that the injury complained
of is due to the negligence of a fellow workman, for which the master is
responsible neither in law nor morals." Durkin v. Coal Co., M71 Pa. St.
193, 202. Cf. Best, C. J., in Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 625, 630: "I am
happy to find in this case that which I find in most others, where statutes
have not interfered, that the common law will enable us to do justice."
76 State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke
Co., 33-W. Va. x88, i9o; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, i86; State v.
Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 315. In State v. Loomis, the court speaks of the
common law incapacities as "natural incapacities." But these cases all
distinguish usury laws, because such legislation has come to be part of our
American common law.
7 Cf. the attempt of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to read con-
tributory negligence into the Federal Safety Appliances Act, Schlemmer
v. Buffalo R. & P. R. Co., -2o5 U. S. i. But the most remarkable example
is to be seen in Grossman v. Caminez, 79 App. Div. (N. Y.) 15, in which
one of the judges, regarding the Statute of Frauds as part of the legal
order of nature, said of a statute which required agents attempting to
sell city lots to have written authority: "It is a denial . . . of a right
or privilege, guaranteed to citizens, to make verbal contracts which are to
be performed within a year."
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rules call only be illustrations of those principles so long as facts
and opinions remain what they were when the rules were an-
nounced. For instance: The cases agree that the term "liberty"
is broader than Coke's use of it; that the fact that Coke confined
it to freedom of physical motion and locomotion does not exclude
a broader interpretation to-day. Yet the same courts that recog-
nize that "liberty" must include more to-day that it did as used
in Coke's Second Institute, lay it down that incapacities are to
remain what they were at common law; that new incapacities of
fact, arising out of present industrial situations, may not be
recognized by legislation." This is, in truth, but another illus-
tration of the purely personal character of all natural law
theories."
Last of the causes suggested, but by no means the least efficient
in bringing about the line of decisions under consideration, is the
sharp line between law and fact in our legal system, due origin-
ally to the exigencies of trial by jury. The line between what is
for the court to pass upon and what is for the jury, has come to
be called a line between law and fact. For purposes of jury trial
the line itself has to be drawn often very artificially. But, beyond
that, when it is drawn the tendency is to assume that questions
which analytically are pure questions of fact, when they become
questions for the court to decide, must be looked at in a different
way from ordinary questions of fact and must be dealt with in an
academic and artificial manner because they have become ques-
tions of law. The tendency to insist upon such a line and to
7s Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 181, 185-187; -Ritchie v. People, 155
Ill. 99, 11; Harding v. People, 16o Ill. 459, 467; State v. Haun, 61 Kan.
146, 162. Cf. People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377.
9 See some illustrations in my paper. Common Low and Legislation,
21 Harvard Law Review, 383. 392-393. See also the statement of Curtis,
J., in Scott v. Sanford, that "all writers" agree that slavery "is created
only by municipal law." 19 How. 393. 626. But Aristotle (Politics, Bk. I,
Chap. V), Grotius (II, 5, 27, Sect. 2 and 29, Sect. 2) and Rutherforth
(Natural Law, Bk. I, Chap. XX, Sect. 4), who are not insignificant au-
thorities, argue that slavery has a natural basis in some cases, beyond and
apart from law. Again, in Wynhamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 454, Hub-
bard, J., said: "Liquor is not a nuisance per se, nor can it be made so by
a simple legislative declaration." Since 'that time, people have changed
their minds, and we find another judge saying: "The entire scheme of
prohibition as embodied in the Constitution and laws of Kansas might fail,
if the right of each citizen to manufacture intoxicating liquors for his own
use or as a beverage were recognized. Such a right does not inhere in
citizenship." Harlan, J., in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
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draw it arbitrarily, has spread from the law of trials to ever) part
of the law. One example is to be seen in decisions as to what is
a reasonable time in the law of negotiable instruments. Another
may be seen in judicial pronouncements as to negligence, which
are leading so many of our state legislatures to turn the whole
matter over to juries in cases of personal injury. Still another
may be seen in the refinements as to constructive fraud and
badges of fraud which led to wide-spread legislation, making
fraud a question for the jury. It is one of the chief factors in
producing what I have ventured to call mechanical jurisprudence
in our legal system. In constitutional law, the necessity for
drawing this line and the assumption that whatever is left to the
court to decide must be dealt with artificially and disposed of
mechanically, operates to the disadvantage of new types of legis-
lation. It is felt that a law cannot be constitutional now if it
would have been unconstitutional one hundred years ago. In
fact it might have been an unreasonable deprivation of liberty as
things were even 50 years ago, and yet be a reasonable regulation
as things are now. But the question is not one of fact. Being for
the court to decide, it must be decided upon some universal
proposition, valid in all places and at all times.8 Rate laws, in
the investigation of which it may prove that a rate is confiscatory
at one time and not at another, are compelling courts to recognize
that the constitutionality of a statute may depend upon a pure
question of fact, to be investigated and determined as such.
Hence, they are likelv to induce a change of judicial attitude to-
ward other legislation, the reasonableness of which must depend
upon questions of fact which only those who have investigated
special industrial situations can fairly determine. As it is, in the
ordinary case involving constitutionality, the court has no
machinery for getting at the facts. It must decide on the basis of
matters of general knowledge and on accepted principles of uni-
form application. It cannot have the advantage of legislative
reference bureaus, of hearings before committees, of the testi-
mony of specialists who have conducted detailed investigations, as
80 Hence when a court had to decide whether the common law doctrine
of riparian rights was applicable to and hence in force in a state where one
part was arid, so that the doctrine could not be applied, another part had
abundant rainfall, so that the doctrine was well suited thereto, and still
another sometimes had rain and sometimes not, it could not say the rule
applies here, and does not apply there, depending on the facts, but had to
insist upon one rule for the whole state. Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500.
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the legislature can and does. The court is driven to deal with
the problem artificially or not at all, unless it is willing to assume
that the legislature did its duty and to keep its hands off on that
ground. More than anything else, ignorance of the actual situa-
tions of fact for which legislation was provided and supposed
lack of legal warrant for knowing them, have been responsible
for the judicial overthrowing of so much social legislation.
Turning now to the actual state of the decisions, let us look
first at the cases in which the idea of liberty of contract has been
invoked to defeat legislation. The fountain head of this line of
decisions seems to be the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Butchers'
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,8 in which he restates the views
of the minority in the Slaughter House Cases.8 2  This opinion
has been one of the staple citations in causes involving liberty of
contract. 83 In it he took a vigorous stand against legislative in-
terference with the "right to follow lawful callings." Although
it did not represent the views of the Federal Supreme. Court, this
opinion had a far-reaching influence in the State Courts. It pro-
duced a reactionary line of decisions in New York on liberty to
pursue one's calling,84 and through these cases its echoes are still
ringing in the books. Mr. Justice Field was eminently the man
to lead this belated individualist crusade. In him a Puritan
ancestry and a Puritan bringing up" were followed by a pro-
fessional career upon the frontier in the time and at the place
where the individual counted for more and the state-imposed law
for less than at any other period in our history. Thus predis-
posed, his thorough study and minute knowledge of the common
law authorities could not fail to make him a prophet of common
law authorities could not fail to make him a prophet of common
the vogue to-day of his dissenting opinion of thirty-five years ago,
uttered to another generation and in view of a distinct industrial
situation, bears abundant witness. But the line of decisions
culminating in the Adair case begins directly with a dictum of
s 111 U. S. 746, 762.
82 16 Wall, 36.
83 Cited and relied on particularly in State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. i79,
183, and through this case and the New York cases, in nearly all the later
decisions. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Illinois, at
least, has fallen into a settled practice of citing the opinion of the minority
in the Slaughter House Cases as if it were that of the court.
84Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377.
85 See H. M. Field, Life of David Dudley Field, Chaps. I and I .
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the Supreme Court of Illinois, a court which has since attained a
bad eminence in this connection, to the effect that legislation pro-
viding how coal should be weighed in fixing the compensation of
miners, was an undue interference with liberty of contract.8 6
Two years later, two cases were decided upon the express point.
The pioneer, and, so far as influence upon the later decisions is
concerned, the leading case is Godcharles v. Wigeman,7 in which,
in an off-hand and positive pronouncement, without discussion or
citation, the court declared that a statute requiring payment in
money of wages in iron mills, was "degrading and insulting" to
the laborer and "subversive of his rights as a citizen." It said:
"An attempt has been made by the legislature to do what cannot
be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making
their own contracts." In other words, it assumed that incapacities
not known to the common law could not be recognized by the
legislature, and ignored the palpable fact that courts of chancery
'had wielded a not inconsiderable power of interference with
freedom of contract. In the same year the Supreme Court of
Illinois passed expressly upon the subject of its dictum of two
years before. The case of Millet v. People 8S turned chiefly upon
the point that the statute was restricted to certain employers and
was not applicable to employers generally. But the court (Schol-
field, J.) said:
"What is there in the condition or situation of the laborer in the
mine to disqualify him from contracting in regard to the price of
his labor or in regard to the mode of ascertaining the price? And
why should the owner of the mine not be allowed to contract in
respect to such matters as to which all other property owners and
agents may contract?"
The court assumes that this question answers itself. It does
not conceive any examination necessary in order to ascertain
whether there is not in fact a difference. It does not consider that
laborers in mines may be in a continual condition of poverty, and,
that, as Lord Northington put it:
"Necessitous men are not. truly speaking, free men. but. to
86 Jones v. People (1884) ; 110 Ill. 590. Sheldon, J., said: "We do not
regard this as requiring that in all contracts for the mining of coal the
wages of the miners must be computed upon the basis of.the weight of the
coal mined. That would be a quite arbitrary provision and seemingly an
undue interference with mens' rights of making contracts."
87 (x886), 113 Pa. St. 427.
88 17 II1. 294.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the
crafty may impose upon them." 8
Godcharles v. Wimenan and Millet v. People soon obtained a
considerable following. They were cited three years later in
State v. Goodwill,90 holding unconstitutional a statute against
payment of wages in mines and factories in store orders, and
State v. Fire Creek Coal and Coke Co.,"
1 deciding against legisla-
tion prohibiting mine and factory owners from selling merchan-
dise to their laborers at a greater profit than when selling to
others. The former case is especially interesting because of its
argument that no new forms of incapacity to contract can be
recognized by the legislature. Speaking of usury legislation, the
court says:
"The right to regulate the rate of interest existed at the time
the Constitution was adopted, and cannot, therefore, be considered
as either an abridgement or restraint upon the rights of the
citizen guaranteed by the Constitution. The power to pass usury
laws ex'ists by innemorial usage: but such is not the case with
such acts as we are now considering."
In the decade 189o-i899, the current of decisions following God-
charles v. [Vigemnan flowed fast. In 189o . in Ex Parte Kuback "0,
the Supreme Court of California held adversely to a municipal
ordinance prescribing eight hours as a day's work on public
works, on the ground that it was an infringement of the right of
persons "to make and enforce their contracts." That the munic-
ipality might have some right to dictate the terms of its own con-
tracts, seems not to have been considered. The following year,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held adversely to a statute
prohibiting the imposition of fines in cotton mills.
0 3 The court
cited Godcharles v. Vigeman, l illet v. People, and State v.
Goodwill; also the New York cases as to the right to pursue one's
calling. It said that the statute was "an interference with the
right to make reasonable and proper contracts in conducting a
legitimate business." But are the contracts forbidden "reason-
able and proper?" The legislature thought they were not. To
the court, tre contrary seemed a matter of course. It was
assumed to be a matter of law. Viewed as one of fact, the ques-
tion assumes a very different aspect. It is interestinz to observe
' I ernon v. BethCll. 2 Eden. i1o, i i..
.o (I889) 33 W. Va. 79.
0' (i889) 33 W. Va. IRS.
q2 85 Cal. 274.
1,1 Com. -'. Perry, (,9) i55 Mass. T17.
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that Mr. Justice Holmes dissented. The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois followed with three decisions. In Frorer 'v. People.," the
statute was directed against company stores and required em-
ployees to be paid weekly. This was held invalid, citing the New
York cases above referred to, Godcharles v. JVigcman, the \West
Virginia cases, E.r Parte Kuback and Conz. v. Perry. Its position is
that the statute interferes with the absolute right to make what
contracts one chooses. But the court recognizes that usury
laws also might be thought to contravene this right, and it
attempts to distinguish them thus:
"Usury laws proceed upon the theory that the lender and the
borrower of money do not occupy toward each other the same
relations of equality that parties do in contracting with each other
in regard to the loan or sale of other kinds of property, and that
the borrower's necessities deprive him of freedom in contracting
and place him at the mercy of the lender and such laws may be
found on the statute books of all civilized nations of the world
both ancient and modern.'
It does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Justice Scholfield
that the necessities of a miner or factory employee might impair
his freedom of contract or put him at the mercy of his employers
in the same way, nor that labor legislation was enacted or enact-
ing in all modern civilized countries, nor that England, which
might be supposed to be a modern civilized country. had
abrogated her legislation against usury."5
In Ramsey v. People," ' the same court had before it a statute
requiring mine operators to weigh coal on pit cars before it was
screened, and to compute the pay of the miners on the basis of
the weight of the unscreened coal. ' In holding the law uncon-
stitutional, the court (per Bailey, J.) said:
"[The statute] attempts to take from both employer and em-
ployee engaged in the mining business, the right and the power
of fixing by contract the amount of wagcs the employee is to
receive and the mode in which such wages are to be ascertained."
That is, the court considered the basis of computation of
miners' wages something that could only affect the miner and
the operators-something in which the public could have no
reasonable concern. How false this assumption was and how
much more sound was the judgment of the legislature, experience
soon made manifest. Ramsey v. People was followed and relied
94 (1892) 141 IM. 171.
0!" 17 and I8 Vict. C. 9o.
9r (1892) 142 I1. 380.
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upon three years later in In re House Bill 2o3, ' in which the
Supreme Court of Colorado advised the legislature of that state
that a bill providing for the weighing of coal at the mine in order
to fix the compensation of miners, was not in accord with the state
nor with the Federal Constitution. As to the latter proposition,
we know now that the court was in error.
98 But the assumption
that the public had no interest in the way in which miners' wages
were paid, which dictated the decision, was speedily refuted by
the ensuing wrangles, strikes and disorders, due to attempts to
secure by force what could not be had by law. "Working people
have striven to obtain by strikes what they had failed to secure
by statute. The lawlessness which has disgraced Colorado, like
the lawlessness which has long disgraced Illinois, is traceable
ultimately to the denial of law by the authorities which alone can
constitute and establish it."99
The third decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois referred
to, Braceville Coal Co. v. People,'00 involves the same questions
and reaches the same conclusion as in the Frorer case.
Legislation requiring payment in money of wages of employees
in mines and factories was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in State v. Loomis.'0 ' The court, as usual,
cited the New York cases, Godcharles v. Wi°Vgenman, and Millet v.
People. It insisted chiefly, however, that the statute tried to.
create a new sort of incapacity. Black, C. J., said:
"This denial of the right to contract is based upon a classifica-
tion which is purely arbitrary, because the ground of classification
has no relation whatever to the natural capacity of persons to
contract."
What is "natural capacity to contract?" Have married women
natural capacity to contract? The Supreme Court of Illinois
seemed to think so in Ritchie v. People.'0' If so, there were some
unconstitutional restrictions upon their contractual powers at
common law which have by no means been removed entirely in
all jurisdictions. If not, then it would appear that natural capacity
means simply common law capacity, and that the court means to
tell us that no incapacities, not recognized by the common law,
can be given effect to by legislation.
U7 (1895) 21 Col. 27.
08 McLean v. Arkansas, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206.
90 Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation, 162. See also p. i44.
100 (1893) 147 Ill. 66.
'"1 (1893) 15 Mo. 307.
102 (1895) '55 Ill. 99.
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Legislation of the same sort came before the Supreme Court
of Arkansas the following year.103 The court upheld it, so far as
contracts with corporations were concerned, upon grounds that
shall be considered presently, but delivered a vigorous dictum to
the effect that it was invalid as to contracts of individuals with
individuals. This dictum was afterwards rejected and the legis-
lation was upheld for all purposes in a later decision.'"' The
year 1894 produced another decision, upholding liberty of con-
tract in Low v. Rees Printing Co.,'0° in which a general eight-
hour law for all except farm laborers was held unconstitutional.
In 1895 we meet with three cases. The first of these, State v.
Iulow,1 6 decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, involved the
point passed upon in the Adair case. The court ruled adversely
upon a statute requiring employers not to prohibit their em-
ployees from joining unions or compel them to withdraw from
unions. The second, decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado,
has been spoken of already. The third, a decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, probably establishes the high-water mark of
academic individualism. Ritchie v. People 107 involved a statute
regulating the hours of labor of women employed in the manu-
facture of clothing. It was held unconstitutional, first, because
(the court said) the legislature has no right to deprive one class
of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like con-
ditions, and second, because liberty of contract is a property right
and cannot be taken away. With respect to the first of these
propositions, one would think it might make some difference
what the respective classes were. Certainly legislation does not
allow women the same political privileges as other persons. More-
over, one would think the question whether the conditions under
which women are emploved in the manufacture of clothing are
03 Leep v. Railway Co. (1894), 58 Ark. 407.
104 McLean v. State, 8I Ark. 3o4. The dictum in the former case re-
peated the doctrine of the Illinois cases, the court saying that a contract
with respect to wages between individual and individual "is necessarily
harmless, of purely and exclusively private concern, and cannot affect any-
one except the parties." Since the coal miners' strike of igoi, courts have
not been so sure of this.
105 41 Neb. 127. A decision of an inferior court during 1894 may be
noted here. In Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 658, the court held adversely to a statute requiring extra compensation
for all labor -over ten hours a day upon railroads.
106 129 Mo. 163.
107 155 Ill. 99.
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the same as those under which ordinary contracts are made, de-
serves investigation. But, to the court, the fact that the jural
conditions were the same was enough. On the second point, the
court cites the New York cases, Godcharles v. Wigeinan, and the
Goodwill, Frorer, Perry and Loomis cases. It says that con-
sequences injurious to the public health, welfare and safety can-
not flow from the manufacture of clothing, and hence that such
manufacture is not a subject of regulation. But we may grant
this and still suggest that the manner of manufacture, by women
and in sweatshops, for instance, may be of grave public con-
cern.
08
The year 1896 produced two dicta in the same line. Harding v.
ir:cople 10' involved a statute regulating the weighing of coal for
the purpose of fixing miners' wages in all mines the product
whereof was shipped by rail or water. The court held that the
classification of mines was unreasonable and the statute in viola-
tion of the provision of the state constitution prohibiting special
laws where general legislation could be made to apply. But Mr.
Justice Cartwright delivered a very confident dictum that the
statute could not be upheld for the further reason that "it takes
awav the freedom of contracting by the parties for the ascertain-
ment of the weight of coal except by a certain method." (p. 467-)
Possibly in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in McLean v. Arkansas, the court would not be
so sure of this point to-day. In Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co..'"
a Circuit Court of the United States had before it a statute pro-
108 In the opinion in this case, Magruder, J.,*Says: "It will not he
denied that woman is entitled to the same rights under the Constitution,
to make contracts with reference to her labor as are secured thereby to
men." (p. iii.) It is worth while to compare this with what the same
court said as to usury legislation in Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. i71, i86.
In the latter case, the court said the legislature could deprive necessitous
debtors of their natural right to contract to pay the highest rate of interest
an avaricious creditor could extort from them because usury laws existed
when the Constitution was adopted. Looking at the matter in this way, is
it not pertinent to inquire whether married women could have made any
contract when the Constitution was adopted? If they could not, would it
follow that legislation could regulate the labor and wage contracts of
married women but not those of unmarried women, or would the faith of
the court in its distinction he shaken? It may be noted here conveniently
that there is also in 1895 a decision of an inferior court of Pennsylvania
following Godcharles v. IVigeman. Cont. . Isenberg. 8 K1lp. 1T6.
")9 6o Ill. 459.
110 71 Fed. 931.
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hibiting railway employees from contracting away their right to
recover for injuries. The statute was held bad because of un-
reasonable classification. But the court was also of opinion that
it involved an unconstitutional interference with freedom of
contract.
Three cases were decided in accordance with the doctrine in
question in 1899. In Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., "' the
Supreme Court of California ruled adversely upon a statute re-
quiring corporations to pay their laborers at least once a. month
the wages earned during the preceding month. The Supreme
Court of Colorado in In re Morgan,1 2 had before it a statute
regulating hours of employment in underground mines and in
smelting and ore-reduction works. The court said that legisla-
tion which prohibited an adult man from working or contracting
to work more than eight hours a day in any lawful private busi-
ness which involved no injury to the general public, on the ground
that longer hours of labor would injure his health, was uncon-
stitutional. It cited the views of the minority in the Slaughter
House Cases, as restated in the Butchers' Union Company case,
the New York cases, and the several cases on liberty of contract
already discussed, relying especially on Ritchie v. People. In
State v. Hann,"' the Supreme Court of Kansas held invalid a
statute requiring wages to be paid in money. The Court said:
"While it might be desirable and profitable to the employee of
such corporation to receive a horse or a cow or a house and lot
in payment for his wages, yet the legislature prohibits payment
in that way and places the laborer under guardianship, classify-
ing him in respect of freedom of contract with the idiot, the
lunatic, or the felon in the penitentiary."
That it is neither desirable nor profitable to the employee to
receive wages in orders upon a company store, was possibly irre-
levant to the purely academic view of such legislation. But
surely the court might have said that the legislation classed the
laborer in rhines with the sailor, over whose contracts courts of
equity exercise a jealous supervision, or a necessitous borrower,
whom equity will not suffer to clog his equity of redemption by
any sort of collateral provisions, however much his necessities
and the exactions of the lender may persuade him they are desir-
able or profitable. No one ever supposed that equity classed
sailor or borrower with idiots, hnatics or felons.




The next year, igoo, the Supreme Court of Illinois had before
it a statute against prohibiting employees from joining or re-
maining in unions. The court following the Julow case, held it
an unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract.
Magruder, J., said that the employer had a "right" to terminate
the contract of employment for any reason he chose, subject to
liability for damages if his act was unwarranted. But damages
are awarded as compensation for wrongs. How can we say that
one must respond in damages for the exercise of a sacred right,
protected by the Constitution and beyond the reach of legislation?
The Julow and Gillespie cases have been followed in all the
subsequent decisions.
11"5
After I9oo, the pendulum had clearly begun to swing the
other way. But there are a number of striking decisions taking
extreme views as to liberty of contract prior to the Adair case.
The most extreme is People v. Coler,"6 in which the Court of
Appeals of New York passed adversely upon legislition with
reference to hours of labor and wages in municipal contracts.
The opinion of O'Brien, J., in this case, is a vigorous discussion
of the economic and political objections to labor legislation from
the individualist standpoint, insisting that such legislation is of
no real benefit to the laborer and is subversive of his natural
rights. Perhaps the most interesting point made in the opinion
is a suggestion that the statute invades a constitutional right of
the contractor to make freely whatever contract he can with the
city. This overriding of the public interest in municipal con-
tracts in the interest of the private contractor with the munic-
ipality, goes beyond any other recorded judicial utterance. It
can be compared only with Blackstone's dictum that the public
good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protec-
tion of every individual's private rights. In Mathews v. People,1lT
the statute, providing a state employment bureau, prescribed that
the bureau should not furnish a list of unemployed laborers to any
employer whose workmen were on a strike. This was held bad on
other grounds, but the court (per Magruder, J.) declared that it
114 Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176.
"15State v. Krcut-berg (1902), IH4 Wis. 530; Coffeyville Vitrified
Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry (19o4), 69 Kan. 297; People v. Marcus (io6),
185 N. Y. 257.
116 (i9ox) 166 N. Y. i.
117 (1903) 202 Ill. 389.
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infringed the liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution"',
In State v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 19 the Coler case was
followed by the Supreme Court of Indiana. In State v. Missouri
Tie & Timber Co., 120 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
a statute requiring employees to be paid in cash or negotiable in-
struments, was an unreasonable interference with the liberty of
contract of adult employees, in Lochner v. New York,'
2
1 a bare
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States took the
reactionary view, as it had fairly become by this time, of a statute
prescribing the hours of labor in bakeries. The view of the
majority in this case, as usual, goes back to the restatement in
the Butchers' Union Company case of the views of the minority
in the Slaughter House Cases. Mr. Justice Peckham cites his
own definition of liberty in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,"' and that
definition is admittedly based upon the views of Mr. Justice Field
and Mr. Justice Bradley in the cases referred to. In the All-
geyer case he had said: "The liberty mentioned in that amendment
means, not oniy the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration; but the term
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
One may grant this definition and yet deny the consequence
which Mr. Justice Peckham derived from it in the Lochner case.
His position was, in effect, that a baker had a constitutional right
to contract to work as long as he pleased. He says (p. 57) :
"There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occu-
pations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care
for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfer-
I1s Possibly more might be said for this statute than the court as-
sumed. In view of the disorders and breaches of the peace which ex-
perience had shown attend labor conflicts, it might be urged that the pur-
pose of the proviso was to preserve the public peace. A provision that the
state employment agency should be used to provide ordinary employment
but not employment to break strikes, has some arguable basis in reason
when we look to the actual facts.
219 (i9o3) i6o Ind. 338.
120 (19o4) 18i Mo. 536.
121 (J9o5) 198 U. S. 45.
122 i65 U. S. 578.
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ing with their independence of judgment and of action. They V:"
in no sense wards of the State. Viewed in the light of a purei)
labor law, with no reference whatever to the question of health,
we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the
safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the in-
terest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such
an act. The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to
the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker.
It does not affect any other portion of the public than those who
are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread
does not depend upoii whether the baker works but ten hours per
day or only sixty hours a week."
It will be seen that this opinion assumes two propositions of
fact: (I) That the public has no concern in how long a baker
works, because the time he works has no effect on the product
of his labor; (2) that there is nothing in the trade of baking, as
carried on in large cities, inimical to the health of those who
are employed in it for long hours at a stretch. Here again study
of the facts has shown that the legislature was right and the
court was wrong. Actual investigation has shown that the output
of shops in which the only kind of men who can be had to work
for unreasonable hours under unsanitary conditions are em-
ployed, is not at all what the public ought to eat, and that long
hours in shops of the sort are distinctly injurious to health.1 23
But the decisive objection to the position of the majority is put
by Mr. Justice Holmes in a few sentences that deserve to become
classical:
"This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law. . . . The Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics. . . . A constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It
123 City Club Bulletin, Chicago. Vol. 2, No. 25 (February 24, gog).
See also the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.,
pp. 70-71. Sir Frederick Pollock makes this very pertinent comment:
"How can the Supreme Court at Washington have conclusive judicial
knowledge of the conditions affecting bakeries in New York? If it has
not such knowledge as matter of fact, can it be matter of law that no
conditions can reasonably be supposed to exist which would make such
an enactment . . . . constitutional ?" 21 Law Quarterly Review, 212.
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is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States." (pp. 75-76.)
Fially, we have two cases, one in the Court' of Appeals of
New York, 2 and the other, the Adair case, in the Supreme Court
of the United States,12- in which the doctrine of the Julow case
is adopted and legislation to prevent employers from prohibiting
employees from joining or requiring them to withdraw from
labor unions is held unconstitutional, as infringing liberty of
contract. In the former case, the court puts the matter thus:
"The free and untrammeled right to contract is part of the
liberty guaranteed to every citizen by the Federal and State Con-
stitutions. Personal liberty is always subject to restraint when
its exercise affects the safei', health or moral and general welfare
of the public, but subject to such restraint, an employer and
employee may make and enforce such contract relating to labor
as they may agree on." (p. 255.)
In other words, the public have no interest in bringing about a
real equality in labor-bargainings, even though thereby strikes
and disorders may be obviated, and have no concern with con-
tracts for labor except where the safety, health or morals of the
public at large may be concerned! This is practically the posi-
tion from which we found the courts starting twenty years before.
Summing up the decisions which insist upon the inviolability
of freedom of contract, we find that the following propositions
have been decided: (i) Legislation forbidding employers from
interfering with the membership of their employees in labor unions
is invalid. All the courts have reached this conclusion. (2)
Legislation prohibiting the imposition of fines upon employees is
invalid. Only one court, however, has passed upon this subject.
(3) Legislation providing for the mode of weighing coal in
order to fix the compensation of miners is held invalid in Illi-
nois, Missouri, Colorado and Kansas, and in West Virginia where
the parties are natural persons. But the Supreme Court of the
United States now holds to the contrary. (4) Legislation against
company stores, requiring employers to pay wages in money, is
held invalid in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado
and California, and in West Virginia as to contracts with natural
persons. But, as we shall see presently, many states and the
124People v. Marcus (I9o6) I85 N. Y. 257.
125 Cxgo8) 2o8 U. S. i6r.
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United States Supreme Court, take the contrary position on one
ground or another. (5) Legislation as to the hours of labor has
been held bad (a) where labor of adult males is concerned (un-
less very clearly of a dangerous or unhealthy character) in
Nebraska and by the United States Supreme Court; (b) where
labor of adult females is regulated, in Illinois-but most of the
State Courts and the United States Supreme Court hold to the
contrary; (c) where the hours of labor on public or municipal
contracts are regulated, in California, New York and Indiana.
But here again many state courts and the Federal Supreme
Court are opposed. (6) One court has also held that legislation
cannot prohibit contracts by railway employees for releasing
their employers in advance from liability for personal injuries.
Federal legislation has probably deprived this question of all
practical interest.
Some of the statutes passed upon in the foregoing cases may
have gone too far. Some of them involved bad or careless classi-
fications. Some of them ran counter to local constitutional pro-
visions, requiring general laws wherever possible. But one can-
not read the cases in detail without feeling that the great majority
of the decisions are simply wrong, not only in constitutional law,
but from the standpoint of the common law, and even from that of
a sane individualism. Looking at them upon common law prin-
ciples, we must first of all recognize that there never has been at
common law any such freedom of contract as they postulate.
From the time that promises not under seal have been enforced
at all, equity has interfered with contracts in the interests of
weak, necessitous, or unfortunate promisors. One of the earliest
cases of equitable interference was to prevent forfeitures to
which promisors had agreed solemnly under seal. Not only did
equity grant to a debtor a right of redemption for which he did
not stipulate, but it would not and will not let him contract it
away in advance or "clog" it by a collateral agreement that will
operate to prevent a redemption. 128  In like manner, equity in-
126 "A man will not be suffered in conscience to fetter himself with a
limitation or restriction of his right of redemption." Lord Keeper Henley
in Spurgeon v. Collier, i Eden 56, 59. "I take it to be an established rule
that the mortgagee can never provide at the time of making the loan for
any event or condition on which the equity of redemption shall be dis-
charged and the conveyance absolute." Lord Northington in Vernon v.
Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113. See Rice v. Noakes (19oo), 2 Ch. 445; Iarrah
Timber, etc., Corporation v. Samuel (1903). 2 Ch. 1.
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terfered to set aside contracts of sailors for the disposition of
their wages or of prize money due them, where they appeared
unfair, one-sided or inequitable.'2 7  It interfered also with con-
tracts of heirs or reversioners in case of inadequacy of considera-
tion, on the theory that they were peculiarly liable to be imposed
on and subject to the danger of "sacrificing their future interests
in order to meet their present wants." 2I It refused and refuses
to grant specific performance of hard bargains, simply because
they are hard, leaving promisees to confessedly inadequate and
nugatory actions for damages. But there are no "natural in-
capacities" here! Courts of equity have simply recognized the
facts of human intercourse, and have not suffered jural notions
of equality to blind them thereto. Again, Lord Holt laid it down
that the two sides of a bilateral contract were independent, be-
cause if a promisor was foolish enough to make his promise in-
dependent in form it was his own fault.1 29 But here too, equity
made an inroad upon common law individualism, and on equit-
able grounds conditions are now said to be implied in law. It
has been said that the common law will not help a fool. But
equity exists to help and protect him. It is because there are
fools to be defrauded and imposed upon, and unfortunates to
meet with accidents and careless to make mistakes, that we have
courts of equity. Surely what equity has done to abridge free-
dom of contract, legislation may do likewise.
Moreover, usury laws, despite all that has been said to the
contrary, furnish a perfect analogy. I have spoken already of
the proposition that usury laws existed prior to our constitutions.
A more ingenious proposition was advanced by Mr. Justice Field
in Munn v. Illinois,'" and is adopted by the court in State v.
Goodwill.131 He said that originally no interest at all could be
taken; that legislation created the right and that usury laws were
not a limitation of an undoubted right, but rather a bound put to
a privilege the legislature had conceded. But the obvious answer
to this is that enforcing a promise not under seal is also a late,
law-granted privilege. The same historical argument that is re-
1.7 How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. Sr. 516, 5P8; Taylour v. Rochford, 2 Ves.
Sr. 281. Legislation in America has carried this even further.
128 Earl of Chesterfield v. Jaussen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125; McClure v. Raben,
125 Ind. 139.
129 Thorpe v. Thorpe, 12 Mod. 455, 464.
13094 U.'S. 113.
131 33 W. Va. i79, i86.
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lied on to dispose of the analogy of usury, overthrows the whole
doctrine of freedom of contract. The public interest in labor
legislation to-day is much more real than its interest in usury
laws. But the two are of the same type.
Rightly considered, even individualist and natural law princi-
ples lead to the same conclusion. The authorities are agreed upon
the "natural" invalidity of a contract to become a slave.13 2 But,
as Sidgwick points out, any "serious approximation to the con-
dition of slavery" comes to the same thing. 3 3 Mill, much more
liberal than his followers, admits this, saying:
"Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate
the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a suffi-
cient reason for releasing them from an engagement that it is
injurious to themselves."
Some of the writers on natural law had argued that there were
cases where natural law justified sale of oneself into slavery. To
this Mill says:
"He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which
is the justification of allowing him to dispose 6f himself." 134
The principle of this applies to any situation where a person by
contract imposes substantial restraints upon his liberty. Freedom
to impose these restraints, in the hands of the weak and neces-
sitous, defeats the very end of liberty.213 Liberty and equality
in fact make for a rational individualism. Academic individual-
ism defeats itself.
Let us turn now to the other side, as represented in the
decisions. It is a saving characteristic of Anglo-American case
law, that decisions upon an unsound princip!e are gradually sur-
rounded by a mass of exceptions, distinctions and limitations
which preclude extension for the future and soon enable the cur-
rent of judicial decision to flow normally. Just as in the natural
body foreign substances are encysted and walled in and thus de-
prived of power for evil, the body of our case law has the faculty
of encysting and walling in rules and doctrines at variance with
a sound condition of the law. Such a process has long been
going on with respect to extreme doctrines of liberty' of contract.
133 Spencer, Justice, Sect. 70. "The principle of freedom cannot re-
quire that lie should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed
to alienate his freedom." Mill, Liberty, Chap. V.
"'a Elements of Politics (2nd Ed.), 93.
IU Liberty, Chap. V.
335 See a case in point in Dicey, Lawz, and Public Opinion in England,
264-265.
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As a result, we may now recognize six categories of cases in
which it has been laid down that labor legislation may interfere
with and infringe upon liberty of contract. The first of these is
the case of corporations. Under the power to amend the char-
ters of corporations, which all states now reserve, it is held that
the state may define the power of corporations to contract, and
that natural persons can have no claim of right to contract with
these creatures of the state beyond their powers. This doctrine,
as applied to labor legislation, originated in Maryland in 188o.136
It has been followed in Rhode Island,'
1 7 West Virginia,13 1
Arkansas,"'9 Tennessee,14 and the Supreme Court of the United
States. '" It was adopted by an appellate court in Kansas, 142 but
rejected by the Supreme Court.143 It has been rejected also in
California,'" Illinois,145 and, Missouri. 46  Second, it has been
held that even if wages themselves may not be regulated, the data
from which to fix wages by any contract to be entered into may be
regulated in order to prevent fraud.' But the decisions noted
above as to weighing statutes, are to the contrary. Third, it is
held that hours and conditions of labor in unhealthy occupations,
such as mining, work in smelters, and the like, may be regu-
lated. 14 8 But just how unhealthy the occupation must be, so that
the court will know it to be such from its general information,
the Lochner case leaves in doubt. Fourth, the overwhelming
weight of authority is to the effect that the legislature may regu-
late the hours and conditions of labor of women and children."4 9
136 Shaffer v. Mining Co., 55 Md. 74.
137 State v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. (1892), 18 R. I. 16.
138 State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. (1892), 36 W. Va. 802.
'39 Leep v. Railway Co. (I894), 58 Ark. 507; Railway Company v.
Paul (i897), 64 Ark. 83.
240 Dugger v. Insurance Co. (895), 95 Tenn. 245.
141 Railway Co. v. Paul (I899), 173 U. S. 404.
14 State v. Hauls, 7 Kan. App. 509.
143 State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146.
144 Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 127 Cal. 4.
14"Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66.
14-6 State v. Missouri Tie & Timber Co., 181 Mo. 536.
147 State v. Wilson (I889), 6i Kan. 32; McLean v. Arkansas (i9o8),
29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206.
2
48 Holden v. Hardy (1898), 169 U. S. 366; In re Boyce (7904), 27
Nev. 299; Ex Parte Kair (igo5), 28 Nev. 127, 425.
149Co..v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. (1876), 120 Mass. 383; Beyman v.
Cleveland (7884), 39 Ohio St. 651; State v. Buchannan (9o2), 29 Wash.
602; Venham v. State (T902), 65 Neb. 394; State v. Muller (I9O6), 48
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Here it is said there are "natural" incapacities. But Illinois holds
to the contrary as to contracts of adult women. 130 Fifth, it has
been held to be within the power of the state to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which it will permit public work to be done for itself
or its municipalities, and hence to regulate wages and hours on
public contracts. 131 But California, New York and Indiana, as
has been seen, hold the contrary. Finally, a number of cases
have taken the sound position that the viode of payment of
laborers is a matter of public concern; that it is competent for the
legislature to require that they be paid in money or negotiable
paper, and that it is competent to require that they be paid
promptly at stated intervals. " 2  Several of these cases reject the
distinction between corporations and natural persons in this con-
nection.1 53 But what is worth more, a number clearly recognize
the actual facts of inequality as between employer and employee
in bargaining for labor in many sorts of employment.
141 And in
Hancock v. Yaden, Elliott, J., makes it clear from alundant ex-
amples that limitations upon freedom of contract in the interest
of individual contracting parties have always existed. It is un-
fortunate that the sweeping assertions of Godcharles v. Wigeinan
should have been made the model for subsequent cases with this
decision at hand in the books.
What, then, is the hope for future labor legislation? On the
whole one must say that it is bright. Not only do the cases last
noted afford many means for escape from the line of decisions
first considered, but there are indications that the courts are ready
to seek such escape. The opinion of Mr. Justice Day in McLean
v. Arkansas, especially is fraught with promise of a return on the
Ore. 252; State v. Shorey (i9o6), 48 Ore. 396; Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S.
412; Starnes v. Allison Mfg. Co. (N. C. i9o8), 6I S. E. 525.
250 Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 99.
]5' U. S. v. Martin (876), 94 U. S. 400; State v. Atkin (igoI), 64
Kan. 7; Atkin v. Kansas (1903), 191 U. S. 207; In re Broad (x9o4), 36
Wash. 449.
152 Hancock v. Yaden (1889), 121 Ind. 366; Opinion of the Justices
(895), 163 Mass. 589; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. (1899), io3 Tenn.
421; Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton (1899), io3 Tenn. 604; Knoxville
Coal & Iron Co. v. Harbison (190), 183 U. S. 13; International Text
Book Co. v. Weissinger (1902), i6o Ind. 349.
153 Opinion of Justices, 163 Mass. 589; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co.,
io3 Tenn. 421.
154 Notably International Text Book Co. v. lVeissinger and McLean
v. Arkansas.
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part of the Federal Supreme Court to its sounder views prior to
the Lochner and Adair cases. Even the Court of Appeals of
New York has recently approved this significant remark:
"Under a judicial system which, has for centuries magnified the
sacredness of individual rights, there is much less danger of
doing injustice to the individual than there is in overlooking the
obligations of those in.authority to organized society." 155
Possibly the decisions first considered, or some of them, were
not without good effect. Doubtless much of the earlier legisla-
tion was crude and some of it was premature. But, on the other
hand, those decisions wrought an injury to the courts and to the
public regard for law and for constitutional law in particular, far
beyond any such incidental good. An acute and well-informed
observer said recently:
"From my own experience, I should say, perhaps, that the one
symptom among workingmen which most definitely indicates a
class feeling, is a growing distrust of the integrity of the courts,
the belief that the present judge has been a corporation attorney,
that his sympathies and experience and his whole view of life is
on the corporation side." 156
The attitude of many of our courts ol the subject of liberty of
contract is so certain to be misapprehended, is so out of the
range of ordinary understanding. the decisions themselves are so
acadlemic and so artificial in their reasoning. that they cannot fail
to engender such feelings. Thus, those decisions do an injury
beyond the failure of a .few acts. These acts can be replaced as
legislatures learn how to comply with the letter of the decisions
and to evade the spirit of them. But the lost respect for courts
and law cannot be replaced. The evil of those cases will live
after them in impaired authority of the courts long after the
decisions themselves are forgotten.
Chicago. Roscoe Pound.
115 Werner. J., in People v:" Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42, 69.
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